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Abstract—Securing the energy delivery system (EDS) from
complex, nonlinear, and evolving cyber threats requires a com-
plex set of changing and interwoven classes of technologies,
policies, relationships, and personnel. One key area in this
technological milieu is assessment methodologies to compare
information, gathered by a variety of means, about networked
devices with publicly known possible threat information about
said devices. This information is used to generate risk-based
characterizations that allow for the adjudication and proper cor-
responding management action chains to be assigned. To address
the current cybersecurity needs in the operational technology
(OT) domain, we developed a novel relative-risk assessment
framework and a software application called MEEDS that can
detect exposed OT systems. This paper presents the detailed
architecture of relative-risk assessment framework methodology
and its integral role in the MEEDS software. The efficacy of the
presented framework is demonstrated by testing with the real-
world systems and vulnerabilities pertaining to the industrial
control systems (ICS) in critical infrastructures.
Index Terms—web spiders, operational technology, cyberse-
curity, industrial control systems, energy delivery systems, OT
cybersecurity
I. INTRODUCTION
Operational technology (OT) is increasingly being con-
nected to facilitate remote control and coordination, increased
performance, physical security, productivity, optimized energy
management, and many more functions. Examples of OT
include devices such as programmable logic controllers (PLCs)
and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) sys-
tems. [1]. These OT systems present in the electricity infras-
tructure are frequently referred to as energy delivery systems
(EDS) [2]. However, the advent of connected technologies
is causing the convergence of the traditional information
technology (IT) and OT systems, increasing the overall risk
for critical infrastructure systems [3] such as the power grid.
Securing the power grid from complex, nonlinear, and
evolving cyber threats requires continuous monitoring to iden-
tify, detect, and respond to threats and vulnerabilities of critical
cyber assets. EDS devices are often inadvertently exposed
to the public-facing internet, which can create vulnerabilities
in one or more devices. Threat actors can exploit these
vulnerabilities to gain access to the utility network. Once
inside the utility network, the adversary can execute commands
or control actions intended to cause faulty operation or damage
to the system. It is essential to continuously monitor and
detect any exposed or misconfigured devices so that owners,
operators of EDS, and the associated utility can mitigate
potential cyber risks. In the recent years, there have been
significant amount of research in the digital forensics domain
[4] [5]. In the digital forensics processes, the forensic analyzer
performs in-depth analysis of devices and data within the legal
context, such as a criminal investigation or civil enquiry. But
only a small number of analyzers focus on the EDS domain.
Furthermore, the ongoing growth in the number of devices and
storage volume requiring analysis puts immense pressure on
timely analysis.In response to the above challenges, this paper
presents a high-level overview of a system called Mitigation of
External Exposure of Energy Delivery Systems (MEEDS) and
provides an in-depth overview of its relative-risk assessment
component1. MEEDS is designed to help critical infrastructure
owners identify exposed and vulnerable OT systems.
In 2014, researchers discovered more than two million
control system devices directly connected to the internet [12].
These exposures can be exploited by adversaries to initiate
adverse events and cyberattacks to disrupt operations, cause
equipment malfunction or damage, or even cause personnel
injury and loss of life. Time after time, it has been evident
that EDSs are becoming a prime target for cyberattacks. This
can be observed from cyber incidents such as those reported
in Ukraine in December 2015 [24] and December 2016 [25].
The convergence of OT and IT systems resulted a need for
enhanced monitoring, control, visibility, and flexibility in EDS
operation.
Recently, researchers have been adopting different existing
frameworks and standards such as the Cybersecurity Capa-
bility Maturity Model (C2M2) [7] [6], National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework
(CSF) [8] [9], Cyber Security Evaluation Tool (CSET®), In-
ternational Organization for Standardization and International
Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC) Standard 31010 to
address the cybersecurity gap in OT systems. In all these
frameworks, risk assessment is a missing piece that is required
to evaluate the risks associated with critical infrastructure
facilities. So, there is an urgent need to develop a relative-risk
assessment framework for internet-facing EDSs that utilities
can use within their electronic perimeter and implement timely
responses for mitigating cyber risks.
MEEDS is designed to integrate with web spider databases
such as Shodan [26] to detect and identify EDS equipment that
may be exposed to the public internet. MEEDS is designed
1This study has been conducted at the Pacific Northwest National Labora-
tory is operated for the U. S. Department of Energy by the Battelle Memorial
Institute under Contract DE-AC05-75RL01830.
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to enable utilities to proactively respond to this information
and secure their networks by mitigating risks arising for the
exposed and vulnerable devices, both internally and externally.
Furthermore, the final version of MEEDS will have a built-
in relative-risk assessment method (presented in this paper)
that will qualitatively recommend associated risk levels for the
detected exposures. In this paper, we demonstrate MEEDS’s
relative-risk assessment framework, which is capable of ana-
lyzing network characteristics and communication pathways of
publicly exposed EDSs. This relative-risk assessment frame-
work uses vulnerability calculations based on the approaches
developed by NIST. Here are the key contributions and char-
acteristics of the present work:
• The framework provides a novel approach to dynamically
construct relative-risk metrics for EDS devices from a
service banner.
• This framework does not require direct interaction with
the inspected services, which ensures identification of
externally exposed devices without affecting EDS OT
operations.
• The framework is nonintrusive and designed with security
best practices. Since MEEDS is not designed to scan
the internal networks, it does not require for the devices
to have any specific open ports. It is important to note
that the goal of MEEDS is to detect and enumerate
externally exposed systems and their parameters such as
vulnerabilities, open ports, etc. However, if the system is
not exposed, other mechanisms (such as scanning tools)
should be used alongside MEEDS.
• The framework is designed to run inside the MEEDS
software2 and collectively, they are divided into client
and server components. MEEDS server component is
designed to run on a computer with internet accessibility
while the lightweight clients are designed to run on any
computer within the network and with the means to have
periodic or continuous reach-outs to the MEEDS server.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. Overview of Web Spiders
Web spiders could be proprietary or open-source software
systems connected to web-based search engines and databases.
These web spiders facilitate the discovery of thousands of
internet-facing information communication technologies, in-
cluding vulnerable internet-facing EDSs. These web spiders
sort the discovered information into categories associated with
the device’s banner and stores that data in their respective
databases. Often, these web spiders have an attribute called
filters that can enumerate common vulnerabilities in legacy and
misconfigured industrial control systems (ICSs)/EDSs (e.g.,
use of default usernames and passwords, weak encryption,
lack of encryption and authentication, lack of authentication in
2MEEDS client system specifications/requirements: 2 GB RAM, 500 MB
disk space, min of 450 MHz 32-bit or 64-bit processor, Windows 7 or newer
operating system, HTTP and SSL communication protocols; MEEDS server
system specifications/requirements: 4 GB RAM, 10 GB disk space, min of 1
GHz 32-bit or 64-bit processor, Windows 7/2008 R2 or greater, HTTP and
SSL communication protocols, PostgreSQL version 10 or higher; Average
query execution time: less than 30 seconds per 100 queries per /24 sub-net
the Ethernet/IP). Attackers could take advantage of these web
spiders and techniques such as Google dorking3 to illegally
gain access to OT networks. However, MEEDS can use those
data sources to proactively discover the exposures and mitigate
them before cyber attackers can attempt any malicious actions.
MEEDS uses the application programming interface (API) of
those web spiders to extract information from their associated
databases. Using these API connections, MEEDS generates
detailed cybersecurity vulnerability reports, provides near-real-
time alerts, and keeps track of historical results.
1) Shodan [26]: Shodan is an internet intelligence organi-
zation that collects information about devices that are publicly
available on the Internet, including EDSs that are part of the
U.S. power grid infrastructure. The resulting data is made
available through a web-based search engine, a developer API,
and an enterprise platform. The main unit of data is the banner,
which contains information about the device such as operating
system, software, and geographic location. The information
can be used to determine the purpose and function of a specific
device. To use this search engine, the technical user is expected
to have knowledge about banners, ports, and services to obtain
information about relevant connected devices facing the public
internet. When queried, the search engine taps its database to
generate responses. The search engine is a query-based system
that uses the existing information already stored in its database.
The search filters can enumerate common vulnerabilities in
legacy and misconfigured ICSs/EDSs (e.g., weak encryption or
lack of encryption and authentication). A knowledgeable user
with enterprise access can use custom queries to enumerate
critical systems that have vulnerabilities and are susceptible to
cyber exploitation. The user can employ those capabilities to
monitor their internet-facing infrastructure and strengthen their
cyber defenses. It has been evident from [10] and [11] that
the researchers have been exploring ways to using the search
engine to perform vulnerability analysis and assessment for
internet-facing services.
2) Project SHINE [12]: Project SHINE (SHodan INtel-
ligence Extraction), a major effort by Infracritical, was de-
signed to catalog internet-facing SCADA and EDS devices.
Project development started in mid-2008 and ended in 2014;
SHINE found more than 2 million control system devices
directly connected to the internet [13] [12]. Project SHINE
built search queries using the names of 182 SCADA suppli-
ers and their leading products [14]. The project discovered
multiple SCADA and EDS devices from over 60 vendors
worldwide. It reportedly discovered some 2000 to 8000 new
exposed devices each day. Suitable and meaningful search
terms to identify control system devices from their meta-
data were used to extract information about the devices that
were directly exposed to the public internet. These devices
included traditional SCADA/EDS equipment, such as remote
terminal units (RTUs), PLCs, intelligent electronic devices
(IEDs)/sensor equipment, SCADA/human-machine interface
(HMI) servers, distributed control systems, and other nontradi-
tional SCADA/EDS devices. Many of the discovered devices
3Google Dorking: In this technique, hackers use google search engine and
similar software/applications to discover security gaps or vulnerabilities in
software and system configuration Page 6937
also revealed their hardware and firmware metadata, which
could provide information about the documented security flaws
associated with the devices. While the project found thousands
of potentially vulnerable devices, the level of vulnerabilities
and the criticality of the systems were not validated.
3) Expanse Inc. (Expander) [15]: Expanse Inc is a cy-
bersecurity start-up company that provides a solution that
continuously monitors the internet to collect information about
all public-internet connected devices. Expanse Inc’s product,
known as Expander, is closed to the general public. Its cus-
tomers are typically large organizations, and the product can
cost anywhere from $250,000 to $1 million per year. Expander
scans the public internet looking for exposed devices, and
alerts its customers about rogue or unprotected devices within
an hour of finding them. The digital assets of the customer
are displayed on a map to show the true network boundary
and inform the customer of other exposures. Although the
product can see all the connected devices, it shows only the
devices that are on the customer’s network and not on other
networks. This is to prevent any kind of malicious use of the
gathered information. Expanse’s product is a software-as-a-
service, web-based product that also offers customer-specific
application programming interface (API) integration. Its cus-
tomer base includes PayPal, Capital One, CVS, other banking
and financial services, IT manufacturing, commercial real
estate, software, health care, and government agencies [16].
4) Censys [17]: Censys is a cloud-based service that con-
tinually scans the public address space and provides an up-
to-date snapshot of the hosts and services running across
the public Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) address space
through a search engine and API [18]. The search results
provide information about the devices that respond, including
details about their software or configuration [19]. Censys
produces structured data about each host and protocol, which
are post-processed to enable researchers to programmatically
define additional attributes that identify device models and
tag security-relevant properties of each host. Search queries
using software- or configuration-related details about a new
security flaw can reveal how widespread it is, and provide
information about the devices that are identified as affected
by the flaw. Censys centralizes the mechanical aspects of
scanning to expose data to researchers through a public search
engine, Representational State Transfer (REST) API, publicly
accessible tables on Google BigQuery, and downloadable data.
5) Reposify [20]: Reposify is a search engine that, by
performing HTTP requests, can provide insight into a mul-
titude of devices that may be connected to the public internet.
The search engine is based on a custom API that not only
discovers new devices, but can also determine what inherent
vulnerabilities the connected devices may have. Reposify can
also determine a device’s relationship with other devices and
people, and whether other technologies may be connected,
such as an operating system, a database, or a web server.
The pricing structure is slightly different because they offer
a free version of the tool that does not include the “Global
Asset Discovery” feature, which is aimed at inspecting and
indexing assets-on-demand. The company is working with a
few cybersecurity and business intelligence companies. The
queries generated using Reposify are limited to the address
range provided and specific ports and protocols. Only one
query request can be active at one time, which limits the
number of requests, and there is a maximum of 65,536 unique
addresses per query.
6) Thingful [21]: Thingful is a search engine that shows
the locations of data-emitting devices on an interactive map,
and provides information about the types of data these devices
emit and the online conversations that arise around them. The
devices are grouped into categories, such as transportation,
energy, or residential. Unlike the other internet search engines
described in this section, Thingful builds its data set from
sensor data sources on the web instead of pinging public
IPv4 addresses [22]. The Thingful application has certain
limitations. For example, access to its data is provided only
via a dedicated user interface [23], and it does not provide
information about SCADA/EDS devices in any of its queries.
B. Overview of CVE and CVSS
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is a
vulnerability evaluation and scoring system developed by
FIRST (Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams) that
quantitatively evaluates system vulnerability [27]. The CVSS
considers known vulnerabilities in devices (known as Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures, or CVEs) and tries to assess
the effect of the vulnerability by looking at parameters such
as complexity of attack vector, confidentiality, integrity, and
availability impacts. The CVSS score has three metric groups:
base, temporal, and environmental.
The “base” metric group quantifies the intrinsic characteris-
tics of a vulnerability in term of two sub-scores: exploitability
sub-score and impact sub-score. The base metric attributes
can be collected from the information provided by product
vendors, where the vulnerability has been discovered. Unlike
temporal and environmental score attributes, the base score
attributes are constant across different user environments and
time points. The CVSS base score is calculated as follows:
Base Score = round to 1(((0.6 ∗ Impact)
+ (0.4 ∗ Exploitability)− 1.5) ∗ f(Impact)) (1)
Here, Impact calculation is based on confidentiality, avail-
ability, and integrity, and Exploitability is based on access
vector, access complexity, and authentication. The CVSS base
scores range from 0 to 10, with 0 indicating a threat of
the lowest significance and 10 indicating a threat of the
highest significance. Qualitative severity rankings of “Low,”
“Medium,” and “High” for CVSS base score ranges are
provided by the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) and
are shown in Table I.
TABLE I
NVD VULNERABILITY SEVERITY RATING FOR CVSS BASE SCORE
CVSS Base Score Rating





C. Other Related Research and Tools
Cybersecurity risks require proper metrics for risk assess-
ment so that one can evaluate the potential effects of the
exposed EDS on the OT side, and multiple research efforts
have explored improved techniques [28] [29] [30] [31]. Cher-
dantseva et al. [34] comprehensively surveyed several existing
cybersecurity risk assessment methods targeting ICSs such as
SCADA systems. In [32], the authors introduced a new type
of cyber risk metrics system that uses both the engineering
operations and economic impacts of cyber attacks on systems.
Also, in [33], the authors proposed a framework that identifies
software risks and proposed organizational risk mitigation
strategies. It is evident from [32] and [33] that while the cyber
risks can be calculated as risk = likelihood ∗ consequences
or a form of such equation, simply analyzing because of the
risk (or likelihood of an attack) may not be sufficient. As
part of the cyber risk analysis, the associated financial impli-
cations would need to serve as one of the key components.
Furthermore, techniques have been introduced to incorporate
the CVSS metrics against cyberattacks in EDSs [35]. In the
network asset discovery and vulnerability assessment domain,
several tools are available, such as Nessus [36], pOf [37],
PRADS [38], NMAP [39], ZMAP [40], and others. However,
it is important to note that not all of those tools can be safely
used in the OT environment.
Cybersecurity risk assessment and management is often
performed in two main areas: 1) organizational policy-based
analysis; 2) organizational network and systems based anal-
ysis. Tools, processes, and methodologies such as the NIST
cybersecurity framework (CSF) [9] [8], CSET [41], C2M2
[6] [7] are designed to assist with organizational policy-
based analysis. Other similar policy-driven risk assessment and
management frameworks can be found in [42], [43], [44],
[45], [46], [47]. On the other hand, tools such as MEEDS,
NMAP, Nessus, etc. are designed to address organizational
network and system analysis. In other words, MEEDS and
its built-in relative-risk assessment framework is designed to
address several objectives listed in the above cited policy-
based analysis framework. MEEDS can assist with:
• ID.RA-1, ID.RA-2, ID-RA5, and ID-RA6 sub-categories
from NIST CSF’s Risk Assessment (RA) category under
the Identify (ID) function.
• PR.IP-12 sub-category from NIST CSF’s Information
Protection Processes and Procedures (IP) category under
the Protect (PR) function.
• DE.AE-2, DE.AE-3, DE.CM-1, and DE.DP-5 sub-
categories from NIST CSF’s Anomalies and Events (AE),
Security Continuous Monitoring (CM), Detection Pro-
cesses (DP) categories under the Detect (DE) function.
• RS.AN-3 sub-category from NIST CSF’s Analysis (AN)
category under the Respond (RS) function.
III. OVERVIEW OF MEEDS RELATIVE-RISK ASSESSMENT
FRAMEWORK
Risk assessment is the first and most critical component
of risk management. Risk assessment involves identifying,
quantifying, and prioritizing EDS device security risks in the
OT network. By conducting a risk assessment that targets the
externally exposed EDS, energy utilities can determine the
overall vulnerability of their devices and develop prioritized
mitigation strategies. As stated in the previous section, web
spiders extract a lot of system-specific parameters through
banner grabbing technique. MEEDS uses some of those banner
parameters (showed in later parts of this section) to perform
relative-risk analysis. The presented risk assessment frame-
work for EDS performs an in-memory mapping of CVE entries
that are found by querying the web spider databases. To
achieve this, the relative-risk framework compiles a list of all
known exposed EDS devices and their CVE IDs into a single
input file by retrieving and processing data from the national
vulnerability database (NVD) in near-real-time.
The framework presented here calculates relative-risks by
categorizing the exposed EDS devices in an OT network
according to their respective CVSS scores. This categorization
will provide information regarding network characteristics and
communication pathways. To achieve this assessment goal,
initially, (i) multiple EDS devices (e.g., PLC, RTU, SCADA)
are queried through MEEDS (note that, as stated previously,
MEEDS uses the web spider databases as one of the data
sources in the back end4) to gather the banner information of
the exposed devices. (ii) Next, a classification is done to iden-
tify whether the exposed banner is actually an EDS (this step
eliminates false positives). (iii) From those identified device
banners, only the banners with CVE IDs are extracted. Note
that not all the exposed device banners will have CVEs, while
some banners may contain multiple CVEs. In the absence of a
CVE ID, Equation 1 can be used to calculate the vector string
and the CVSS score using the banner information returned
by the web spider (through MEEDS) queries. (iv) Finally,
an aggregated CVSS score is calculated for the discovered
devices and they are categorized into respective risk categories
(see Fig.1).
A. Web Spider Queries
Web spiders perform an intensive, per-target scan on phys-
ical (Open Systems Interconnection [OSI] layer 1) devices,
network (OSI layer 3) protocols, and transport (OSI layer 4)
protocols. Some web-spider-scan APIs evaluate two scanning
configurations: (1) an EDS port scan and (2) an EDS device
scan. These two scanning configurations scan the EDS network
immediately upon request by using the on-demand scanning
capabilities of the API. Table II lists the queries from those
two scan API configurations.
B. Classify Device Categorization
Querying through MEEDS generates potential device ban-
ners. However, those banners are not always related to EDS
ports. For example, for queries such as PLC through MEEDS,
4MEEDS relies on multiple external datasources such as the web spider
databases, national vulnerability database, etc. To successfully make the data
retrieval calls using the application programming interfaces (APIs) of those
external sources, certain ports should be open on the system that runs MEEDS.
For example: since the MEEDS queries are executed through HTTPS calls,
port 43 should be open to execute the queries and receive the data from the
external sources. Page 6939
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Step 1 : Query
*Device 3 does not contain any CVE ID; the CVSS score is extracted
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Step 3 : Identify CVE and CVSS Step 4 : Aggregated CVSS and categorize devices
Fig. 1. High-level overview of proposed MEEDS relative-risk assessment framework
TABLE II
STANDARD PORT CONFIGURATION QUERIES





502 Modbus TCP HMI
102 S7/MMS/ICCP/IEC 61850 PAC
4712 C37.118 Relay
4840 OPC DNS
20000 DNP3 Smart Meter
it sometimes generates http and ftp banner information that is
not directly related to the PLC. Instead, that information refers
to the handshaking process and related data pertaining to the
PLC. Hence, an appropriate device categorization is necessary
to eliminate banners that are not related to EDSs.
In the presented research, classifying a device type based on
its banner is achieved using regular expressions (RegEx) on the
data value attribute of the banner. That information is uniquely
indicative of a device type; therefore, a device cannot be
categorized if the RegEx does not find a match in the banner’s
metadata. False positives are eliminated or reduced by issuing
search terms that are multifaceted and distinctive to a targeted
banner. Search filters are applied to the queries to limit/scope
the results related to the exposed devices, and the data fields
of the returned banners are queried using a RegEx dictionary.
RegEx terms of the targeted device type are used to query the
banners in the sequential order of dictionary entries using a
tiered approach. Finally, banner classification is complete upon
a successful match, although succeeding RegEx queries could
also match. Search terms are created and combined to produce
a RegEx dictionary for each device type by examining the
data properties of the banners and identifying consistent and
unique properties. Fig.2 provides a simple example of device
classification methodology for the PLC query. In this case,
a total of 238 banners were found. From those banners, 120
banners have RegEx “PLC Name:”, 58 banners have RegEx
“PLC Type:”, and 4 banners have RegEx “Unit ID:”. Hence,








Shodan Search Filters used to target ICS 




name: SIMATIC 300\n 
Ladder Logic Runtime: 
ProConOS V4.2.00098 
JAN 16 2009\n PLC Type: 
Unit ID: Oln-- Device 
Identification: Schneider 
Electric BMX NOE 0100 
Example data field of banner. 










Match / Total Banners 
Classified: 76% 
Fig. 2. Example flowchart of device classification for PLC query
C. Identify CVE
To identify CVEs, the banner information of the detected
(potentially exposed) EDS is analyzed. In the first step, the
MEEDS relative-risk assessment framework checks whether
the banner has any CVEs. If the CVEs exist, they are used
to query the NVD [27] to extract the corresponding CVSS
scores.
As mentioned previously, not all banners will have CVEs, so
it is not always possible to extract the CVSS scores. To get the
CVSS scores of unassociated CVEs, the MEEDS framework
generates a vector string by analyzing the metadata of that
banner.
The following steps provide an example of how to construct
a CVSS vector string by analyzing the banner information.
Please note that the value assignments below are illustrative
and the end user can assign these factors according to their
environment. MEEDS is designed to be flexible, to fit any
EDS environment.
• Attack Vector (AV): This metric reflects the process of
vulnerability exploitation. For example, the metric value
“network (N)” indicates that the vulnerability can be
exploited through network access. Because the exposed
device is found through MEEDS, the vulnerability is
remotely exploitable. This framework always assigns
network (N) to the AV metric. Page 6940
• Attack Complexity (AC): This metric measures the com-
plexity of the attack required to exploit the vulnerability
once an attacker has gained access to the target system.
The web spider banner contains a property/attribute called
tag, and it returns a value such as VPN, ICS, etc. This
tag describes the purpose of the device. Assuming that
most of the ICSs in the energy domain might be strongly
protected through the firewall and different types of
security mechanisms, if the tag properties return ics, this
framework assigns high (H) to the AC vector; if not, the
framework assigns Low (L).
• Authentication (AU):This metric measures the number
of times an attacker must authenticate to a target in order
to exploit a vulnerability. The framework assumes that
the vulnerable command is only available after successful
single authentication and assigns Single (S) to the AU
vector.
• Confidentiality (C): Confidentiality refers to limiting
information access and disclosure to only authorized
users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to,
unauthorized users. This framework assigns Low (L) to
the C vector based on the assumption that in the EDS
domain, unauthorized disclosure of information could be
expected to have limited adverse effects on organizational
operations, organizational assets, or individuals.
• Integrity (I): The Integrity metric measures the effect
on integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. The
MEEDS framework assumes that a complete loss of
system protection will compromise the entire system, and
therefore assigns Complete (C) to the I vector.
• Availability (A): A loss of availability is the disruption
of access to or use of information or an information
system. This metric measures the effect on availability of
a successfully exploited vulnerability. In the OT domain,
availability is given the topmost priority to maintain
system operations. This framework assigns Complete (C)
to the A vector.
Fig. 3. Banner information of exposed PLC without a CVE ID
The following scenario illustrates the process of CVSS
string constructions using the presented framework. Fig. 3
shows a snapshot of banner information of an exposed PLC
that does not contain any CVEs, and Table III describes the
process for constructing a CVSS vector string by analyzing the
exposed PLC banner information. The overall vector string of
this banner is (AV : L/AC : H/Au : S/C : P/I : C/A : C)
and the CVSS score is calculated as shown below:
Impact = 10.41∗(1−(1−0.275)∗(1−0.666)∗(1−0.666)) =
9.53
Exploitability = 20 ∗ 0.395 ∗ 0.35 ∗ 0.56 = 1.5484
BaseScore = round[0−1](((0.6 ∗ 9.53) + (0.4 ∗ 1.5484) −
1.5) ∗ 1.176) = 5.6
TABLE III
CREATE VECTOR STRING BY ANALYZING BANNER
Vector Metric Value Metric
Score
Explanation
AV Network (N) 1.0 Modbus protocol uses Port 502 and thisport is open in the Modbus server
AC High (H) 0.35
The tag mentioned in this banner is
“ICS”; therefore, it is strongly protected
through the firewall and different types
of security mechanisms.
AU Single (S) 0.56 The PLC uses single authentication.
C Partial (P) 0.27
Access to some system files is possible,
but the attacker does not have any
control over what is obtained
I Complete (C) 0.66 Total compromise of system integrity
A Complete (C) 0.66 Total shutdown of the affected PLC
MEEDS Risk Assessment Algorithm 
Input: (a) A list of NVD database file, 𝑥 =
{𝑁𝑉𝐷2006. 𝑗𝑠𝑜𝑛, 𝑁𝑉𝐷2007. 𝑗𝑠𝑜𝑛, … , 𝑁𝑉𝐷2019. 𝑗𝑠𝑜𝑛} 
(b) A list of downloaded Shodan search queries, 𝑦 =
{𝑃𝐿𝐶. 𝑗𝑠𝑜𝑛 … . , 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝐷𝐴. 𝑗𝑠𝑜𝑛 } 
Output:   The CVSS score and vector string of exposed EDS devices 
# Load and extract the entire CVE information from the NVD 
database 
1. For 𝑖 in 𝑥:
3         NVD = load the CVE item of json data;  
3.         For 𝑗 in 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑁𝑉𝐷 : 
4.     Temp_score  = Identify base score 
5.     Vector = Identify vector string  
6.     If   𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 <  3.9,   set Impact =‘𝑙𝑜𝑤’;  
7.     Else if   𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 <  6.9,  set ‘𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚’;  
8.     otherwise set ‘ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ’ 
9.     Final_dictionary = (Temp_score, Impact, Impact) 
   # Extract the Shodan queries data and identify the exposed OT 
devices with categorization 
10. For 𝑖 in 𝑦: 
11. Attr = rear the Shodan data and split all the banner 
12.   For 𝑗 in 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟: 
13.    If ‘Vulns’ in 𝑗:     # check ‘vulns’ exists or not  
14.   Value = Attr.append(‘Vulns’) 
15.   For i in number of  vulns: # count number of exposed  
16.    If vulns = = Final_dictionary 
17.       Result = (𝑖, Temp_score, Vector) 
18.   Else Value = Result    # create vector string and get result  
using CVSS   equation  
D. Calculate Aggregated CVSS
An exposed device that has multiple CVEs will be cat-
egorized into three vulnerability risk categorization buckets:
high, medium, and low. This categorization is applied to the
vulnerabilities of the exposed device based on the CVEs
and does not evaluate the device as a whole. The CVEs
found to be associated with a device are evaluated by their
CVSS scores using the device categorization algorithm, which
produces a weighted average CVSS score for the device.
The range of weighted arithmetic mean CVSS scores for
low risk categorization is 0.0-3.9; medium risk categorization
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is 4.0-6.9; high risk categorization is 7.0-10.0. The device
categorization algorithm uses the following arithmetic mean
formula:





y = count of CVSS score
w = weight of CVSS score (3.9, 6.9, 10.0)
n = High categorization
k = Low categorization
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this work, we conducted several experiments and tests to
validate the proposed framework. In this section, we present
the results of these experiments and the associated data to
confirm high performance of the proposed MEEDS framework
in terms of execution time and the false/true positive rates. The
experimental analysis mostly focused on PLCs, RTUs, and
SCADA systems, because those are the most common and
some of the most significant systems in an OT environment.
A. Analysis
For the experimental analysis, the search terms that were
used in the queries are “PLC,” “RTU,” and “SCADA.” Al-
though the generated data is accessible through simple queries,
the data is obfuscated (see Fig. 4, Fig. 5, and Fig. 6) for
privacy and confidentiality. A particular exposed device falling
under a class (such as RTU, PLC, etc.) is named “device 1,
device 2. . . device n.” Each device has a banner with zero or
more CVEs. Fig. 4, Fig. 5, and Fig. 6 show snapshots of
output from the queries “PLC,” “RTU,” and “SCADA.” These
figures show that most exposed devices for a particular query
contain multiple CVEs. For example, for PLC queries, device
1 contains 15 CVEs; four of them are rated high criticality, ten
are rated medium criticality, and one is rated low criticality.
The extracted information is not associated with a specific
network, geographical location, facility, vendor, or threat. The
results of these queries were each stored in multiple JavaScript
Object Notation (.JSON) files, resulting in approximately 100
different exposed devices per file. The CVEs associated with
an exposed device are a field that the query results return along
with the CVSS v2.0 base score. This CVSS v2.0 base score
is then used to categorize the CVE by following the rating
rubric shown in Table IV. To query CVEs in the NVD and
gather the CVSS v2.0 vectors, a locally stored copy of NVD
is loaded into a Python script to search the CVE.
Table IV shows the overall device criticality of the exposed
device after aggregating all CVSS scores. Note that the table
only represents PLC queries. After device classification, this
framework identified a total of eight exposed PLCs out of
100 devices, and each of the exposed devices has multiple
CVEs. Out of those eight exposed devices, five devices fall
in the medium criticality range and three devices fall in the
high criticality range. It is important to note that most of the
OT devices are critical towards maintaining secure operations.
Therefore, the corresponding CVSS associated with the OT-
related vulnerabilities are often high enough to be categorized
as medium or high. This pattern is also reflected in table IV
where all the exposed PLC devices fall under the medium and
high criticality categories.
Fig. 4. PLC device output file
Fig. 5. RTU device output file
Fig. 6. SCADA device output file
TABLE IV






According to CVSS v2 WeightedAvg. Score
Device
CriticalityHigh Med Low
Device 1 15 4 10 1 7.52 High
Device 2 6 2 1 3 6.43 Medium
Device 3 5 3 2 0 8.76 High
Device 4 4 0 1 3 4.65 Medium
Device 5 2 0 1 1 5.40 Medium
Device 6 3 2 1 0 8.95 High
Device 7 2 0 2 0 6.9 Medium
Device 8 10 2 6 3 6.20 Medium
B. Device Behavior during Assessment
Web spiders query for the banner information of exposed
devices through a scanning technique that reviews a target
attribute via TCP (SYN, SYN-ACK, ACK) three-part hand-
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shaking [48] [49]5. Nonintrusive scanning techniques have
fewer negative effects on device functionality because these
techniques allow a scanner to scan the network without
interfering with the server or client. Also, the messages (i.e.,
banner information) of some of the web spider scanners are
small, and therefore do not raise any flags in the EDS defense
systems [48]. By extracting the banner information from
web spiders, the MEEDS framework can perform relative-risk
assessment of the externally exposed devices without affecting
EDS OT operation.
V. CONCLUSION
The main objective of the MEEDS relative-risk assessment
framework is to use data of exposed OT devices from multiple
sources (web spiders, CVE, NVD, etc.) and calculate the
relative-risk scores of the exposed devices in such a way
that the device operators can easily understand which devices
need to be prioritized for mitigating the exposures. Using
the presented qualitative relative-risk assessment and scoring
framework that will be integrated into MEEDS software,
some of the risks associated with inadvertent OT exposures
arising from IT and OT convergence could be addressed. As
articulated in the previous sections, MEEDS uses a novel, non-
intrusive process of enumerating the exposures to help the end
users to better manage the overall risk of their network and
help them address the CVEs. Furthermore, MEEDS along with
the presented framework will facilitate the implementation of
a well-informed mitigation plan6 and continuously monitor the
network throughout its life cycle.
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